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Abstract
The present article addresses the question of secularism in Greece. It discusses the
prevalent modernist and civilisationist explanations of the recent crisis in state-
church relations in Greece. Based on the idea that there is neither a single route to,
nor a single pattern of, modernity and secularism, the article argues that the
entanglement between state and church in modern Greece does not necessarily
indicate either incomplete modernity or incomplete secularism. The paper empha-
sises both the structural weakness of the Orthodox Church in the modern Greek
state and the secularisation of the church’s ideology as core dimensions of the
particular pattern of secularism in this country. The recent crisis is interpreted as
a result of the twofold challenge of democratisation and globalisation that this
historically grown pattern of secularism is facing over the last decades. Further, the
article seeks to demonstrate that the nationalist stance of the Church of Greece
should not be seen as persistent blind traditionalism and anti-modernism.
Keywords: Secularism; State-church-relations; Modernity; Nationalism; Eastern
Orthodoxy; Greece.
A d v o c a t e s o f E u r o p e a n modernity and cosmopolitanism
in Greece are deeply worried about the actual state as well as the future
perspectives of the Church of Greece (CoG). What gives them cause
for concern is that the Orthodox Church of the country does not keep
pace with the changing world within which it operates. In their eyes,
the church is neither able nor willing to adapt to the emerging cultural
and political environment. It prefers to hide its head in sand. According
to the constitutional law expert Antonis Manitakis, the CoG seems
to have not realized that we do not live in a closed monolithic society, that the
cultural boundaries are abolished and that there are no longer impervious
territories controlled by a single church. (Manitakis 2000, p. 14)
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The church is reproached for clinging to nationalism and desper-
ately trying to barricade itself inside the nation-state instead of
acknowledging the new role of religion resulting from the growing
erosion of the nation-state order and the corresponding emergence of
a new global political and cultural reality. Its critics claim,
in the era of globalisation, state protectionism, complacent isolationism,
tenacious ostrich-like behaviour and flight backward are formulas of failure.
(Sotirelis 1999, pp. 78-79)
Against the background of the increasing de-nationalisation of the
world, its ethnocentric message appears to be
historically obsolete, at least for the level of cultural development in Greece,
socially, as always, indifferent, and morally ignorable. (Manitakis 2000, p. 130)
These concerns about the ideological backwardness of the CoG
escalated as a result of its growing presence and increased activities in
the Greek public sphere over the last decade. Greek modernists
mostly object to the CoG’s claim that it can legitimately intervene
in political matters. The framing of this ‘‘religious expansionism’’
(Mouzelis) as a serious dysfunction of a modern, secular, and func-
tionally differentiated society has led to the repetition of the mantra of
state-church separation in the Greek press. According to certain
modernist accounts, state-church separation would benefit both state
and church. While the political system would become more demo-
cratic, the church would have the opportunity to develop into a more
spiritual and philanthropic institution (Mouzelis 2008). Sometimes it
is even argued that the side to benefit most from state-church
separation would be doubtless Orthodoxy (Sotirelis 1999, p. 73). In
other words, Greek modernists profess to know better than the church
what is good for the church.
The aim of the present article is twofold. On the one hand, I want
to take up the question of secularism in modernity, and suggest
conceiving of the variations in state-church relations less in terms of
different degree and more in terms of different patterns of secularism.
On the other hand, the present article seeks to demonstrate that the
CoG is not banging its head against a wall, but is reflecting on its
position in the national and global arena. My aim is to show that the
public performance of the CoG over the last few years is not based on
miscalculation; it rests on a well-founded assessment of a suitable way
to meet the challenges of contemporary reality. I do not claim that the
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nationalist path which the CoG has decided to take is the only way or
even the most appropriate way to respond to the challenges it faces, I
am rather concerned with the question of whether the church is
capable of making a reasonable appraisal of its own position and future
in a globalised world. To disapprove the politically reactionary and
nationalist ideology of the Orthodox clergy in Greece is one thing; but
to claim that, ‘‘they know not what they do’’ is quite another.
Two points are central to my argument. First, I suggest that the
focus of the analysis be shifted from the church as religious entity with
a set of appropriate tasks ascribed to it, to the church as an organisation.
This shift in focus can help both avoid normativity and gain context-
sensitivity in the analysis. Accordingly, I do not accept a priori that
spirituality, non-interference in politics, philanthropic engagement,
and a cosmopolitan discourse of hope and fraternisation, tolerance and
peaceful coexistence, love and reconciliation, etc. are constituent pri-
orities of a church. Despite their genuinely religious nature, churches
have to respond to fundamental problems – their survival and con-
solidation as organisations in a changing world – as do other organ-
isations. Churches that fail to respond to these problems are doomed
to disintegrate as organisations sooner or later. By the same token, the
capacity of churches to attend to these issues successfully attests to
their adaptability and context-bound thinking. Indeed, if churches
want to continue to function as social actors, they must think in
context. They must be fully aware of their own capabilities in the
particular historical (local as well global) context in which they are
active.
Secondly, I suggest shifting the focus from the strength of the CoG
in the narrow religious sphere of Greece to its structural weaknesswithin
the Greek state. By strongly emphasising the quasi-monopolistic priv-
ileges of the CoG in Greece, scholars have rarely turned their atten-
tion to the structural weakness of the church, which, however, lies at
the core of the particular pattern of secularism of the country. Shedding
light on the extremely weak position of the CoG vis-a`-vis the state
would be helpful in two respects. First, it would help recognise the
state-church configuration in Greece as a pattern of secularism. Second,
it would help avoid a serious shortcoming of modernist and civilisa-
tional accounts: the tendency to attribute responsibility to the wrong
social actor when something goes wrong in Greece. By overlooking the
structural weakness of the CoG some of these accounts boil down to
blaming the church – directly or indirectly – for those matters for which
the state historically carries the primary responsibility.
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Greek state-church relations in crisis
Over the last decade, state-church relations have generated a highly
contentious public debate in Greece. The debate involves a broad
range of actors such as political parties and individual politicians,
members of the Greek Orthodox clergy and its associated organisa-
tions, constitutional law experts, sociologists, historians, theologians,
journalists, and civil society associations (in particular human rights
and religious minority organisations). It has been carried out in nu-
merous academic publications: reports, statements and comments have
appeared in Greek mass media. The political background of this con-
troversy is the growing tension in the relations between the Greek
government and the CoG since the late 1990s, particularly since the
election of the then Metropolitan of Dimitrias (Volos) Christodoulos
as Archbishop of Athens and All Greece in 1998. The crisis reached
its culmination in an acrimonious dispute about identity cards in the
years 2000 and 2001. At that time, the social democratic government
under the premiership of Kostas Simitis decided to implement the
decision of the newly created Supreme Data Protection Authority to
remove the indication of religious affiliation from the identity cards
carried by Greek citizens. Pointing out the central importance of the
Orthodox faith to Greek national identity, Archbishop Christodoulos
called upon the government to reconsider the issue and withdraw the
bill. The government, however, refused to negotiate with the church
on this matter. It argued that the spheres of authority of the two
institutions were clearly distinct and that matters pertaining to the
identity cards lay in the domain of state control and regulation. ‘‘We
do not rule together,’’ was the government’s message to the church.1
Subsequently, the CoG organised popular protest through mass
demonstrations and a mass signature campaign. Although the gov-
ernment considered it a closed matter from the very beginning and
tried to direct the citizens’ attention to issues that enjoyed high
priority on its agenda, the dispute about the identity cards dominated
Greek public life for about a year overshadowing other issues of great
importance to the country, e.g., Greece’s entry into the eurozone and
Cyprus’s entry into the European Union (EU). Finally, the CoG
succeeded in collecting over 3 million signatures in support of holding
a referendum on the issue of allowing optional entry of religious
1 For a systematic account of the argu-
ments brought forward by both sides cf.
Molokotos-Liederman 2003.
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affiliation on the identity cards. But despite its impressive capacity to
mobilise people, the CoG was unable to assert its will against the state.
Finally, both the Council of State (Supreme Administrative Court of
Greece) and the European Court of Human Rights dismissed the case
of the CoG against the Greek state.
In a way, this dispute between the political leadership of the
country and the CoG was anything but exceptional. It simply epitomised
the deep crisis that has been developing in their relations over the last
decades. Still, the level of discord between state and church never rose
as high as it did with regard to the issue of identity cards. One reason
for this escalation is the fact that on the issue of identity cards, in
contrast to previous disputes, the heads of church and state took
a well-defined stand from the outset: the state held that there should
be no indication of religious affiliation on the identity card and the
church wanted to allow its optional entry. These set positions did not
leave much room for mutual concessions, and therefore, neither could
compromise without losing face. Moreover, the crisis could not be
managed by the familiar principle of treating the controversial
regulation as ‘‘valid but inactive,’’ because once the prime minister
took a clear position in parliament, public opinion would have
interpreted any change as an ‘‘unordered withdrawal.’’ The major
distinction between this conflict and earlier ones, however, is the fact
that each side challenged the other’s authority to decide the issue.
Thus the conflict clearly indicated the entanglement of church and
state in Greece.
Despite the significant improvement in the relations between
government and church after the victory of the conservative party
Nea Dimokratia in the 2004 parliamentary elections,2 the public
debate on the relationship between state and church did not end.
The Archbishop’s provocative comments only a few days after the
elections (‘‘Finally, the Almighty Right of the Lord shows what God
and the people want’’ or ‘‘The situation changes, thank God!’’),
evoked critical reactions. He continued to voice in public his position
on all issues of ‘‘national’’ importance (from the Annan plan for
reunification of Cyprus and the admission of Turkey in the EU, all the
way to the contents of history school books), which invariably raised
2 Prominent members of the Nea Dimok-
ratia party, first and foremost party leader
and later Prime Minister Kostas Karamanlis,
had supported the signature campaign of the
church during the identity card crisis and
even presented their support as a matter of
belief. But after their election victory, to
which the church also contributed, they had
no qualms about considering the question of
the identity cards as a closed matter (Ta Nea,
2007, November 16).
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the question of state-church relations. In spring 2004, the CoG once
more was in the forefront of public debate as a result of a dispute with
the Patriarchate of Constantinople about the jurisdiction to appoint
bishops in the so-called ‘‘New Lands’’ of Greece, i.e. the territories
incorporated into the Greek state after the Balkan Wars and World
War I. And, last but not the least, the disclosure of an unprecedented
corruption scandal, which exposed a criminal network of members of
the judiciary and the clergy in 2005 once more brought the CoG into
the limelight. Expectedly, the public controversy on state-church
relations in Greece did not come to an end with the passing away of
Archbishop Christodoulos in January 2008. In the run-up to the election
of his successor and long-time adversary, Archbishop Ieronymos, the
issue was widely commented upon in the press. Since then, every
reference to controversial statements or dubious dealings of clergymen
triggers the demand for a clear separation of church and state. The
debate has developed its own dynamics and is no longer limited to the
persons originally involved. It reflects a structural problem that cannot
be solved through change of persons.
Explanations and objections
At the core of the debate lies the question of secularism in Greece.
Both modernists and church frame the crisis as a dispute over the
secular or non-secular nature and future of the Greek state. Since
secularisation theory has always been a particular strand of modern-
isation theory, it is hardly surprising that the issue is framed using the
dichotomy of modernity vs. tradition. According to the modernist
narrative, politics, and especially the social democratic government,
represents modernity while the church embodies tradition. Modernity
stands, among other things, for rationality and individuality, liberal
democracy, cosmopolitanism and openness towards the world, future-
orientedness (progress) and, last but not the least, for secularisation:
a process in which religious thought, practices and institutions lose
their social significance as a consequence of a clear-cut distinction
between public and private spheres. Since religion, due to its non-
rational foundations, has to be relegated to the private sphere of
modern life and the government of a modern state may not interfere in
the private matters of citizens, the removal of the entry of religious
affiliation from Greek identity cards was considered a step towards
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modernity. Correspondingly, the reaction of the church is framed in
terms of traditionalism and anti-modernism, i.e. commitment to
irrationality and communitarianism, ethnonationalism, closedness
towards the outside world, past-orientedness (conservativism) and
anti-secularism. The church’s refusal to withdraw from the political
arena is viewed as a serious obstacle to modernisation.
Problems related to modernity and secularism in Greece are often
formulated with arguments borrowed from civilisation theory, even
though authors may not always refer to it explicitly. This is not
surprising either, taking into consideration that, since Max Webers’
seminal work on the Protestant Ethic, the exploration of the (in-)com-
patibility of religions/denominations with modernity has developed
into a very popular exercise among social scientists. In the comparison
of major Christian denominations, Eastern Orthodoxy comes off par-
ticularly badly (cf. Mihelj 2007; Agadjanian and Roudometof 2005,
p. 19; Makrides 2005, p. 185). So, if Protestantism has contributed
decisively to the emergence of modernity, Eastern Orthodoxy has
proved to be an impediment to it (cf. Pollis 1992, 1993; Mappa 1997).
The civilisation theory arguments primarily refer to the intellectual
and political tradition of Eastern Orthodoxy: mysticism in the re-
ligious experience; the fact that this part of the world has never
experienced the major intellectual developments of Western civilisa-
tion such as the Renaissance, the Reformation and the Enlightenment;
the concept of the person in Eastern Orthodoxy which does not allow
the development of the concepts of the individual and of human
rights; the centuries-old caesaropapist configuration of power in
Eastern and South-Eastern Europe etc. Following Samuel Huntington
(1993, 1996) and extensively quoting Adamantia Pollis (1987, 1993),
Payne (2003) frames the disputes between church and state over the
identity cards, religious freedom and homosexuality in contemporary
Greece as a clash of civilisations, caused by the fact that Greece is part
of the Orthodox civilization as well as member of the European Union.
Since the philosophical traditions and values of Western liberal civ-
ilisation represented by the European Union seem to be incompatible
with those of Eastern Orthodox civilisation, the European integration
process inevitably leads to a clash of civilisations.
My objections against these narratives, which are widely used to
explain the recent crisis between state and church in Greece, are
methodological, conceptual and empirical. The methodological objec-
tions relate to the access to, and thereby the spectrum of, data used to
analyse the conflict. As Anastassiadis has established, a basic problem
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with the analysis of the crisis using civilisation and modernisation
theory lies in the emphasis on the level of public discourse (public
addresses, statements, sermons, interviews, texts, etc.) (Anastassiadis
2004) and consequently in the disproportionate attention given to
the self-representation of the actors involved. One could argue that the
actors deliver the categories and concepts for the analyses. While
Greek governments and especially the last social democratic govern-
ment (1996-2004) made extensive use of the semantics of modernity in
their self-representation, the church took up the role of the keeper of
tradition.3 Deducing the grounds for actors’ performance exclusively
from their self-representation is, however, more than questionable. In
fact, we must ask ourselves why actors represent themselves the way
they do. Categories used by social actors, even if they have a long
tradition as analytical categories in the history of social science, should
be treated primarily as categories of practice (cf. Brubaker and Cooper
2000; Brubaker 2005). After all, keywords like ‘‘modernity’’ and
‘‘tradition’’ are very popular in Greece and can be, therefore, used
to mobilise people.
My conceptual objections are based on the extensive criticism of the
classical sociological concept of modernity and modernisation and the
related macro-sociological theories. In the present context, I would like
to confine myself to three points: first, the sharply dichotomous terms in
which these theories structure human development (tradition-modernity,
community-society, religion-science, irrationality-rationality, ascrip-
tion-achievement, etc.) lead to a considerably distorted perception of
both ‘‘life in tradition’’ and ‘‘life in modernity.’’ The widely accepted
but hardly sustainable proposition of secularisation theory, according to
3 The following statements by Archbishop
Christodoulos and Prime Minister Simitis
during the identity card crisis are typical of
these positions. Archbishop Christodoulos:
‘‘Some intellectuals, advocates of the Enlight-
enment and the allegedly religiously neutral
society, are trying to impose a brutal and
inhuman regime over the conscience of be-
lievers, all in the name of freedom and human
rights. Behind this obstinacy lies the secret
wish to transform Greece into a secular state.
We want discussion but our partners in the
discussion must have felt and experienced
what Orthodox moral and Greek-Orthodox
tradition mean and not have any inferiority
complexes towards other cultures and moral
conceptions’’ (Excerpt of the program ‘‘The
hour of the Archbishop’’ on the broadcasting
station of the CoG, 14.04.2000, cited in
Eleftherotypia, 15.05.2000).
Prime Minister Simitis: ‘‘We must finally
accept that it is an achievement of our civili-
sation that the state is no longer interested
today in our inner world, as was unfortunately
the case in earlier times. . . . The entry of
our religion in our personal documents is
directly or indirectly limiting and violating
the citizen’s religious freedom . . . With this
statement, the government wishes to close
this matter. It is a matter that has taken
an unexpected dimension for a mature
society; . . . a self-evident matter in a modern
state under the rule of law’’ (Minutes of
a parliamentary meeting on 24.05.2000 from
the Website of the Greek Parliament).
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which people in Europe were devoted Christians in the Middle Ages and
lost or would lose their belief against the background of growing
rationalisation in the era of modernity, is a typical example of such
a distorted perception (Stark 1999). Rather than defining a historical
break caused by modernity, the above-mentioned opposition series
represent complementary processes and structures of modernity.
‘‘Tradition,’’ ‘‘customs,’’ ‘‘community,’’ ‘‘ethnicity’’ and even ‘‘re-
ligion’’ do not refer to pre-modern elements to be doomed in the era
of modernity, but rather to products of modernity (cf. Hobsbawm and
Ranger 1983; Anderson 1983; Asad 1993; van der Veer 2001). Sec-
ondly, as a theory that elevates a particular configuration of social pro-
cesses in the West to the rank of universal norms, the classical theory
of modernity/modernisation is both ethnocentric and hegemonic. By
strongly emphasising ‘‘endogenous’’ factors of development, it sys-
tematically disregards the constitutive importance of Western domi-
nation over the rest of the world for modernity in the West (Randeria
et al. 2004). Last but not least, the classical concept of modernity/
modernisation, not unlike evolutionism in nineteenth century
anthropology, lacks context-sensitivity and historical contingency. It is
unidirectional, teleological and, therefore, has strong essentialist traits.
The multifarious critiques of the classical concept led to a paradigm
shift in the sociology of modernity. The theory of multiple modern-
ities conceives of modernity as an open project and contextualises it in
space and time (Daedalus 2000; Eisenstadt 2000). The new pluralist
perspective identifies several routes to (Therborn 1995), and config-
urations of, modernity with their inherent contradictions in different
parts of the world. Development patterns or models which are
different from those in the West are no longer viewed as anomalies,
aberrations or obstacles, but as concrete projects generated under
certain local and historical conditions. This perspective, which has
also gained ground in the analysis of state-church relations in the
Orthodox world (Prodromou 2002, 2004; Roudometof 2005), enables
us to capture the relation of the Orthodox churches to modernity
much more accurately than has been the case hitherto. It provides the
opportunity to grasp the notorious anti-Western attitude of Eastern
Orthodoxy not as a refusal of modernity per se, but as a rejection of
a specific hegemonic concept of modernity (Makrides 2005).
Acknowledging the plurality of modernities enables us to admit
a plurality of routes to, and configurations of, secularism in modern
states. One of the most widespread misunderstandings of the strand of
secularisation theory focusing on state-church relations is the equation
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of certain configurations like ‘‘state-church separation’’ or ‘‘neutrality
of the state towards all religious communities’’ with secularism per se.
Both conceptions of secularism are rooted in the idea that modernity
and liberalism are inherently connected; the connection, however, has
been historically contingent. Secularism in modern states is not
limited to the above-mentioned configurations. As in many other
countries in which the state was the main moving force of modern-
isation, the route to secularism in modern Greece was state control
over religious institutions. As Nikki Keddie put it,
some applications of secularism in practice mean something quite antithetical to
the ideal of church-state separation. They produce instead increasing control of
the church by the state. . . . In such countries, with strong religious institutions
that formerly controlled much of law, education and social welfare, the state had
to take power from those institutions to introduce modernising and centralising
changes. (Keddie 1997, p. 25)
The outcome of this route to secularism varies from country to
country. Not only the degree of state control differs, but patterns of
secularism based on state control vary as well. Modern Turkey and
Greece are cases in point. In Turkey, where the master narratives of
the nation-state have been formulated in clear contradistinction to the
religious foundations of the imperial past, state control involved
efforts to keep religious symbolism out of public life. If the extensive
interference of the state in religious affairs is occasionally viewed as
consistent with secularism, the reason may lie in the tension between
the concepts of nation and religion in the history of modern Turkey.
In Greece, in contrast, where the tension between nation and religion
has never assumed proportions similar to those in Turkey, state
control over religious institutions has been combined with the pro-
tectionist regulation of the religious market and the prevalence of
Eastern Orthodox symbols in the public. In both Turkey and Greece,
however, state control has targeted at – and finally succeeded in –
weakening the former powerful religious institutions and limiting
their scope of action to a considerable extent. The fact that these
patterns, and in particular the Greek one, normally are not qualified as
secularism but often as its opposite is not a result of their failure, but
because they deviate from the ‘‘orthodox’’ model. We should keep in
mind that words like ‘‘control and power . . . all too rarely enter the
discussion of secularism’’ (Keddie 1997, p. 32).
Referring to the classical theory of secularisation David Martin
remarked, ‘‘it could be criticized as an ideological and philosophical
imposition on history rather than an inference from history’’ (Martin
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2005, p. 19). In essence, such a statement entails the demand for
sociological research to move away from a priori theorising and
become more empirical. The same demand arises from acknowledging
the relevance of local-historical contexts for the emergence of social
designs in the paradigm of multiple modernities. A turn towards more
empirical research could make for both a more differentiated picture
of reality and a more balanced view about similarities and variations
between modern societies. In the case of the classical theories of
modernity and secularisation, the imposition of abstract models on
empirical reality resulted in empirical deviations from the abstract
model being either downplayed or not perceived in the West, while
they were emphasised outside the West. In the same way, similarities
between the West and other parts of the world were overlooked or
downplayed. Essentialist civilisation theory, which hardly took into
consideration the internal plurality, dynamics, adaptability and com-
patibility of Eastern Orthodoxy with democracy (Makrides 2005;
Prodromou 2004, 1994) had similar consequences. It could only boil
down to the orientalisation of Eastern Orthodoxy (Prodromou 1996,
pp. 134-142; cf. Fokas 2000, pp. 291-295). My empirical objections to
the analyses of the crisis between state and church in Greece based on
modernisation and civilisation theory are raised against this back-
ground. They relate to the highly selective treatment of empirical
phenomena, typical of approaches based on essentialist and ideal-
typical perception of reality.
Critiques of state-church relations in Greece and the religiously
partisan stance of the Greek state occasionally point out state-church
separation and religious neutrality of the state in Western Europe,
although this ‘‘European Europe’’ (in Maria Todorova’s terms) can
hardly claim state-church separation or religious neutrality of the state
for itself (cf. Keddie 1997, pp. 24-25; Davie 2001, p. 457; Madeley and
Enyedi 2003). This distorted perception of Western secularism is not
unique to Greece. It appears to be typical of countries of the
periphery. The idealisation of the West has always been an essential
component of the construction of backwardness of the ‘‘rest’’ by
modernist discourse. As Rajeev Barghava put it, however,
Western secularism, too, is essentially contested, with no agreement on what it
entails, the values it seeks to promote, or how best to pursue it. . . . [E]ach
country in the West has worked out a particular political compromise rather
than implementing a solution uniquely required by the configuration of values
embodied in secularism. The separation thesis means different things in the US,
in France, Germany and Britain, and, is interpreted differently at different
times in each place. (Barghava 1998, p. 3)
143
the greek state and the orthodox church
use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003975609000447
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 10 Jul 2017 at 15:09:37, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of
The repeated demand of advocates of Western modernity in
Greece that the CoG should concentrate on its original tasks, i.e.
the tasks attributed to it in a modern, liberal, functionally differen-
tiated society, and leave the field of politics to the politicians, is
selective in two respects. On the one hand, one has to raise the
counterfactual question whether these advocates of Western European
modernity in Greece would ever have made the same appeal to the
church, had the latter – for whichever reason – supported the gov-
ernment’s modernisation agenda publicly and by all possible means.
As this is not very likely, there are grounds for believing that the so-
called problem of secularism in Greece lies not so much in the fact that
the church expresses political views but rather in what it actually
says.4 On the other hand, the request to keep out of politics should not
be addressed exclusively to the CoG. The ‘‘Note on the general
elections of 2008’’ published by the Spanish Bishops’ Conference en-
couraging Spanish voters to elect parties and programmes that ‘‘are
compatible with the belief and the requirements of life as a Christian’’
(such as ‘‘the defence of human life as from conception’’ and the pro-
motion of the family ‘‘based on marriage between man and woman’’),
and more particularly, the mention in the note that ‘‘a just society may
not recognise terrorist organisations as political dialogue partners,’’
goes far beyond the original tasks of the church in Western Europe as
well. While the speech addressed by the Valencian Cardinal Agustı´n
Garcı´a-Gasco to over 160,000 demonstrators in Madrid (expressing
his criticism of the ‘‘nefarious laws’’ and the underlying ‘‘culture of
radical laicism’’ which leads to the ‘‘dissolution of democracy’’)
(Tagesanzeiger 03.03.2008) is evocative of the speeches of Archbishop
Christodoulos made to the cheering masses in Athens and Thessalo-
niki in June 2001, how is one to judge the reaction of Prime Minister
Zapatero, who threatened to cut the church’s subsidies, if it did not
stay out of politics? Could it be called modern and secular, according
to the principles of a strict state-church separation or state neutrality?
And would Prime Minister Zapatero have ever asked the church to
stay out of politics if it had supported him and not his rival? Typical of
an orientalistic discourse, similar events in Greece are framed as
problems of incomplete secularism, i.e. a low degree of institutional
4 Stavrakakis refers to the all-encompass-
ing social significance of politics in our times
and makes the following comment, ‘‘it is not
politicization in general which is to blame; on
the contrary, it is only politicization that will
make possible, in due course, the democrati-
zation of Church institutions themselves. It
is the particular politicization many dislike’’
(Stavrakakis 2003, p. 163).
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differentiation between the political and the religious spheres (Mou-
zelis 2008), whereas this is not the case in Spain. In any case, the
entanglement of state and church, in the form of either churches
interfering in the relationship between state and citizens or political
establishment (or institutions) lending manifold support to churches,
has a long-standing tradition in Western Europe. Denying this does
not help in understanding events in Greece. Similarly, civilisational
analyses of the conflict clearly betray the imposition of abstract models
on reality and selective use of data, when we consider that in the last
decade the relationship between the CoG and the Vatican was at its
best ever (Anastassiadis 2004, pp. 16, 24, 31-32) while the relationship
between the CoG and the Patriarchate of Constantinople has been
through one of the worst crises in its history.
The pattern of secularism in modern Greece
The pattern of secularism in modern Greece has two core
dimensions: (a) transformation of the church into a state authority
and the resulting limitation of both its sphere of responsibility and its
organisational capabilities, and (b) secularisation of the church’s
ideology, i.e. appropriation of the secular state ideology by the church.
In the narrow religious sphere, the church did not forfeit its dominant
position. The latter was even strengthened by state protection. Critics
of state-church relations in Greece tend to focus on the hegemonic
position of the church, in order to establish lack of secularism.
However, only by turning attention to the secular control over, and
ideology of, the church, the state-church configuration in Greece can
be recognised as a pattern of secularism in a modern nation state.
The hegemonic position of the church in Greece
The problem of secularism in Greece is often described as
a problem of both incomplete differentiation between the political
and religious spheres and curtailment of religious freedom. Much of
the discussion involves the Greek constitution. In the eyes of some
scholars it is the constitution, which allows and legitimates the strong
public presence of the CoG and its officials in Greece (Lipowatz
1998). As far as religious freedom is concerned, the opinions of con-
stitutional law experts vary. Whereas former minister Venizelos is of
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the opinion that the constitution guarantees the citizen freedom of
religion and, thus, there is no need for a wide-ranging constitutional
revision (cf. Venizelos 2000), others maintain that some constitutional
articles allow for interpretations which result in a violation of the very
religious freedom that the constitution is said to protect (cf. Alivizatos
1999, 2000; Sotirelis 1999).
As in almost all previous Greek constitutions, the preamble to the
current constitution (since 1975) provides: ‘‘In the Name of the Holy,
Consubstantial and Undivided Trinity.’’ The President (Art. 33, x 2) as
well as the members of the parliament (Art.59, x 1) have to take oath in the
Name of the Holy Trinity, while provision for an alternative oath is made
for deputies of other faiths but not for the non-religious (Art. 59, x 2). The
swearing-in ceremony of the President, the members of parliament, and
even the government – for which there is no formal regulation – takes
place in the presence of the Archbishop of Athens and All Greece. The
constitutional article according to which the religion of the ‘‘Eastern
Orthodox Church ofChrist’’ is the prevailing religion in the country (Art.3,
x 1) is also a remnant of all previous constitutions. The article that grants
freedom of religious belief (Art. 13) considers only ‘‘known’’ religions
(x 2 and 3) and strictly forbids proselytising (x 2). Furthermore, the state
commits itself in its educational mission to nurture the national and
religious conscience of the Greek people (Art. 16, x 2). This commitment
is the legal foundation for both the daily prayers in schools and the
state’s assumption of the costs for the Orthodox tuition in Greek schools.
According to the constitutional law expert Nicos Alivizatos, the
privileges of the CoG in the Greek state order derive from two
different sources in Greek law: the legal status of the CoG as a public
law entity and the prevailing religion clause in the Greek constitution.
Referring to privileges deriving from the legal status as a public law
entity like tax-exemption, remuneration by the state and execution of
administrative acts, he remarks that they ‘‘do not in fact differ sub-
stantially from the advantages granted even to non-established churches
by other European legal orders.’’ The most important privilege of the
CoG deriving from the prevailing religion clause in the Greek constitu-
tion is Orthodox tuition in the Greek schools. He concludes that
although these privileges are generally more important and wider ranging than
in other European models, they are not exceedingly so. . . . [I]n some respects
Greece grants fewer privileges of this sort than countries such as Ireland and,
more recently, Poland and Croatia, which have given the Roman Catholic
Church a more important role on societal issues like abortion and divorce.
(Alivizatos 1999, pp. 27-28)
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Indeed, the individual constitutional articles and legal provisions
are far from unique in an international comparison. The peculiarity of
Greece lies in the ‘‘extent of the complex of regulations concerning the
relations between church and state, and which as a whole is unique in
Europe’’ (Fountedaki 2000, p. 660, italics in text; cf. Fountedaki 2002,
p. 192).
The CoG is not the only religious institution to enjoy this legal
status in Greece. The Central Israelite Council of Greece and its
various communities are also public law entities, whereas the mufti
authorities are state departments, and the muftis are upper-level
public servants. It is the legal status of the direct competitors of the
CoG (i.e. the Catholic Church and the Protestant churches) as well as
other more or less ‘‘known’’ religions, which is often unclear and
entails serious negative consequences affecting their work in Greece.
Granted that the status of a religious institution as a public law entity
involves not only privileges but also state control, the churches that do
not enjoy this status are, in effect, no more free than the churches
that enjoy it. Rather, they are hindered in doing their work. This
brings us to a further source of the dominant position of the CoG in
the country: the restriction of the religious freedom of non-Orthodox
people due to certain legal provisions (cf. Alivizatos 1999, pp. 28-32)
as well as political practices. Giorgos Sotirelis summarises the various
forms of curbs upon religious freedom in Greece as violations of the
following rights: (a) the right to free religious education, (b) the right
to conceal one’s religious beliefs, (c) the right to disseminate religious
beliefs, and (d) the right of freedom of worship. He adds that several
other regulations and practices on the part of the secular and religious
establishments contribute to a further aggravation of this situation
(Sotirelis 1999, pp. 21-41).
Even if certain constitutional and legal provisions may seem
neutral at first sight, in practice they prove to be protecting the
CoG from its competitors. Although the prohibition of proselytism
applies also to the CoG – in contrast to past legislation that prohibited
proselytising only against the CoG – it is obvious that the latter is not
affected by it as 97 % of the Greek population are at least nominally
Orthodox. The prohibition to proselytise in conjunction with the
engagement of the state in Orthodox education constitutes the main
tool for regulating the Greek religious market in favour of the CoG.
The way in which formally neutral regulations work as pillars of the
CoG is unsheathed most obviously in the strict prohibition of
conscientious objection for religious reasons in Greece up until quite
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recently. With the exception of members of the Greek Orthodox
clergy, this prohibition has always applied to all male citizens,
independently of their belief. In practice, however, conscientious
objectors in Greece have been almost exclusively Jehovah’s Witnesses.
Between the introduction of this regulation during the Greek civil war
(1946-1949) and its relaxation in 1997 and 2001, two men were ex-
ecuted, five tortured to death, forty-two sentenced to death and ano-
ther twenty-six condemned to serve a life sentence; a further sixty-eight
were deported to camps and over three thousand were condemned to
prison sentences of up to fourteen years (Beis 2001). Until 1997,
‘‘more than 100 persons per year were being sentenced by courts-
martial for insubordination because they refused to wear the uni-
form,’’ while over the last two decades of the last century ‘‘the average
number of those permanently held in jail for this reason was approx-
imately 300’’ (Alivizatos 1999, p. 31). Moreover, until 2001, consci-
entious objectors were in fact excluded from public service since their
convictions for insubordination were entered in their criminal records.
Thus there were serious disincentives for converting from Orthodoxy
to the creed of the Jehovah’s Witness.
In sum, the Greek state regulates the religious market in Greece in
a way which guarantees the hegemonic position to the CoG. This
position is reflected in the ubiquity of Eastern Orthodoxy’s symbols
in Greek everyday life. The omnipresence of Orthodoxy goes hand-
in-hand with the almost total absence of symbols of other denomina-
tions or religions. Even so this state protectionism does not exclude
secularism. As already indicated earlier, equating secularism with
church-state separation or state neutrality assumes that modernity is
necessarily connected to liberalism: the connection between the two is
arbitrary, however.
Making the church a state authority
From the very beginning, the driving power of secularisation, and
modernisation in general, in Greece has been the state. The route to
secularism consisted in the submission of the church to secular state
power. This had a twofold structural impact on the church: first, it
significantly limited the sphere of responsibility of church, i.e. the
church was marginalised in numerous substantial domains of public life
(e.g. education, law, and administration), in which it played a seminal
role in the past (Makrides 1997); and second, it hampered growth of
the church’s organisational capabilities, i.e. it structurally debilitated
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church as organisation. Consequently, the church never developed the
capacity to evolve and follow an agenda independently of the state.
Already the establishment of the autocephalous CoG resulted in
the complete subordination of the church to the Greek state. As the
Patriarchate of Constantinople, the historical centre of Greek Ortho-
doxy, lay outside the borders of the newly founded state and the
Patriarch was thus considered a ‘‘hostage’’ to Ottoman power, the
demand for an independent church was raised very early in in-
dependent Greece. In particular, West-oriented liberal intellectuals
(‘‘secularists’’) advocated the dissociation from the Patriarchate. In
1833, only a year after the borders of the new state were mapped, the
autocephalous CoG was founded. The autocephaly had a vast impact
on the Orthodox Church in Greece. The church changed from an
institution that embodied the Greek nation to a state authority
(Stavrakakis 2003, p. 165). In addition, independence from the
Patriarchate did not entail self-administration. The Catholic king
became head of the church and its administration, and a synod con-
sisting of five members nominated by the government was to hold the
spiritual leadership of the church. No decision of this synod was valid
in the absence of the royal commissioner; nor could any synodal de-
cision be published or executed without prior approval of the govern-
ment. Further, the synod, or any other spiritual authority or individual
clergyman was prohibited from corresponding or directly contacting
an external worldly or spiritual authority without prior approval of
the responsible government department (Wittig 1987, p. 82).5 Next to
the limitation of the church’s sphere of responsibility, the range of
‘‘internal church affairs’’ was considerably reduced. Even excommu-
nication was defined as a ‘‘political act’’ and could not be implemented
without prior consultation of the state authorities and appearance
of the affected person in front of a court (Vogli 2008, pp. 183-184).
So, the entanglement of state and church in Greece is a result of the
secularisation of Greek public life.
In the following decades, the law regulating state-church relations
did not change much. Since 1844 the king was no longer the head
of the church, but many matters pertaining to the internal
5 In order to explain this ordinance his-
torically, particular reference is made to the
Protestant background of the then co-regent
Georg Ludwig von Maurer. Further, the
Bavarian consistorial constitution of the time,
the national churches in the Protestant West,
and the Russian Orthodox Church have been
referred to as models of this state-church
configuration. However, one should not
disregard the fact that the ordinance was
authored with significant Greek participation
and met with the approval of the bishops
(cf. Frazee 1969; Wittig 1987, pp. 80-85).
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administration of the church continued to remain within his compe-
tence. It is symptomatic of the development of the state-church
relations in Greece that church charters guaranteeing a certain degree
of autonomy in internal administration matters were only enacted in
1923 and 1943, when the Greek state was in a very weak position. In
1923, the Greek state was considerably weakened as a result of long-
lasting wars, the devastating defeat of the Greek troops in Asia Minor,
and the deep division of the Greek society due to the ongoing political
dispute between liberals and royalists. The church charter of 1923,
which introduced for the first time a synod of all bishops (synod of
hierarchy) as the supreme authority of the church, did not remain in
force very long, however. Against the background of the political
troubles of the 1920s and 1930s it was first changed, and then
suspended. A church charter granting a certain degree of autonomy
to the church was only enacted again in 1943 by a very weak Greek
government under German occupation (Wittig 1987, pp. 95-100). At
the end of the 1960s, the military junta abolished the existing church
charter and replaced it by one that assured the state greater scope for
intervention. Finally, the autonomy of the church was ensured again to
some degree after the fall of the junta and the democratisation of the
country, i.e. with the constitution of 1975 and the church charter of
1977. Still, there can be no question of an independent CoG. The inner
administration of the church including its relationship to the Patri-
archate of Constantinople remains regulated by state law and cannot be
modified unilaterally by the church. Moreover, canonical edicts of the
church are only valid after their publication in the government gazette.
The fact that the election of the Archbishop of Athens takes place in the
presence of the Minister of Education and Religion may be of only
symbolic significance but is still indicative of the overall relationship.
Since the state has tight control over the church, political crises
rapidly become church crises (Karagiannis 1997). Modifications of the
church charter generally went hand-in-hand with political changes
and power struggles. The leading organs of the church were repeatedly
bypassed, regulations were introduced that benefited the election of
bishop candidates favoured by the state, and non-compliant synods
were suspended. Among the fourteen hierarchs who held the office of
the Bishop and (since 1923) Archbishop of Athens in the twentieth
century, seven were forced to resign, one of them twice, while
another’s election was subsequently not recognised and the elected
bishop was even banned before he could accede to the seat of the
Archbishop three years later.
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Subordination of the church to the state is further reflected in
repeated confiscations of land ‘‘owned’’ by the church. According to
the former Director of Economic Affairs of the CoG, the property of the
church has shrunk to a mere 4 % of its original size since the foundation
of the Greek state (Pylarinos 2002). Already in the first decade after the
foundation of the Greek state, numerous convents were dissolved and
their land expropriated. In the late 1910s and early 1920s, properties
belonging to convents were made available to landless farmers under
the aegis of extensive land reforms. In 1952, the church handed over
80 % of its serviceable land (arable land and pastures) to the state.6
From the point of view of the CoG, throughout these expropriations
the state hardly fulfilled its obligations towards the church.
Although the idea that the CoG owns a ‘‘property of mythical
proportions’’ is widespread in contemporary Greece, the church
seems to encounter serious difficulties when it tries to exploit this
property. It is noteworthy that its lands are not administered centrally
but by 6,700 public entities (convents, parishes, dioceses, etc.). The
exact extent of these properties has never been recorded, and when
titles exist at all, they are contentious. In addition, legal restrictions set
considerable limits to the exploitation of this property (Nikolopoulos
2005). The state alone is in a position to establish clarity in the
confused ownership structures. Until it takes the necessary steps, the
property of the church will remain a matter of negotiation between
two unequal partners.
Church leaders and officials tend to link the funding of the clergy’s
salaries from the state treasury – first introduced in 1945 and later
developed into a very controversial issue – to the confiscation of the
church’s land property in the past. As the recent Archbishop of
Athens put it some years ago,
the payment of the Orthodox clergy’s salaries is the minimum compensation
for the bulk of the property handed over by the church to the state or snatched
by the latter in various ways. (Ieronymos 2005)7
6 The last time the state made efforts to
confiscate church property was in the late
1980s. This time the government’s plans met
with strong opposition from the church. In
the end, both sides came to a compromise,
the implementation of which, however, was
held in abeyance in the following years.
7 It is worth noting here that, in 1952, the
Greek government extorted the assent of the
church to its plans by threatening, among
other things, to stop paying the clergy’s
salaries (Karagiannis 1997, p. 108). Accord-
ingly, the church now claims that it would
bear the costs for the clergy’s salaries if it
could get the property back, for which it
did not obtain appropriate compensation
(Nikolopoulos 2005).
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Even if there is no formal or legal ground for connecting these two
issues (clergy’s salaries and compensation for confiscated land), they
can hardly be dissociated from each other. If for no reason other than
the fact that state-church relations in Greece are a political matter and
not a matter of law in the strict sense. Some people may consider the
state funding of the clergy’s salaries unacceptable in a secular state,
but it does not imply lack of secularism in Greece. What this funding
shows is the church’s economic dependence on the state and its
extremely weak position vis-a`-vis the state.
Furthermore, the subordination to the state had consequences,
which aggravated the already weak position of the church. Television
and press reports in 2005, which brought to light the involvement
of the clergy in manipulated judgments, embezzlement of funds,
blackmail, criminal networks, sex scandals, etc., did not really come as
a surprise to either the pious or the agnostic Greeks. In fact, these
lapses dramatically demonstrated what the Greeks have known for
a long time: a significant part of the Orthodox clergy is highly corrupt
and morally questionable. The argument that the clergy’s corruption
is an inevitable effect of the church’s role as extension of the
exceedingly corrupt Greek public administration (Mouzelis 2008,
1998a, 1998b), can hardly be dismissed. Corruption and other scandals,
in turn, have contributed decisively, though not exclusively, to shaking
the people’s trust in the church’s ethical resources. The lower the trust
in the moral integrity of the clergy, the more dependent the church
becomes on the state for its survival. Finally, the idea suggests itself that
there is a systemic relationship between corruption, clergy selection and
the ‘‘administrative’’ role of the church in Greece. As the educational
requirements to become a priest in Greece are very low,8 ordination to
the priesthood becomes an easy path to ‘‘public service,’’ i.e. a job
funded by the state. This is bound to affect the profile of people who
choose to enter the clergy.
The CoG has never existed as an independent entity and therefore
never learned to act independently. This lack of experience limits its
scope of action even more. It never had to worry about gaining
members or increasing its legitimacy among the population as other
churches do. It could not and did not have to create its own basis
of legitimacy. Bearing in mind that social welfare work today has
8 According to official data of the CoG, in
2002, only 2614 (30 %) of the total of 8,663
priests of the CoG had a university degree;
2,354 (27 %) had attended secondary school
to grade 12; 1,815 (21 %), secondary school to
grade 9; and 1,880 (just under 22 %) were
elementary school graduates (Antoniadou
2002).
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developed into one of the core bases of legitimacy of churches all over
the world, the question arises whether there is a systemic link between
the limited scope and the antiquated nature of the CoG’s social
welfare work on the one hand, and its externally secured legitimacy
(by the state) on the other. Even if the CoG enjoys (independently of
its spiritual and material resources) a hegemonic position thanks to
government support, which other churches can only dream of, this
must not belie its evident structural weakness. The Orthodox Church
in Greece has never been as weak and as lacking in resources as in the
modern Greek state.
Secularisation of the church’s ideology
The strong and extensive state control of the church in modern
Greece and its marginalisation in social life resulted in both trans-
formation of the church into a mechanism providing legitimacy to
political power and full adoption by the church of the master ideology
of the modern Greek state: nationalism. In a society plagued by serious
contradictions,
Orthodoxy remained pivotal in the articulation of the state’s hegemonic
ideology and was used as a medium of social cohesion and integration.
(Makrides 1997, p. 190)
The nationalisation of the church’s ideology went along with the
construction of a particular version of Greek national history in the
second half of nineteenth century, which provided the ideological
justification for Greek irredentism (the so-called Megali Idea) in the
following decades. This narrative postulated a cultural continuity of
the Greek nation from ancient Hellenism through the imperial
tradition of the Byzantine Empire and the Ottoman rule to modern
Greece. By reconciling the tension between Hellenism and Chris-
tianity this ‘‘invented national tradition’’ invited the church to make
its own contribution to the future of the Greek nation.9 A serious
effect of the ideological congruence between state and church in
Greece was the conflation of religious and national symbols (cf. Gazi
2007).
9 Former President Christos Sartzetakis
(1985-1990), an outright nationalist, ex-
pressed the state’s expectations from the
church in his plea in favour of the indepen-
dence of the CoG from the Patriarchate of
Constantinople: ‘‘. . . [H]ad the autocephaly
[of the Church of Greece] not existed . . . our
church would not have been able to support
us and to bless our weapons during the
subsequent advance to free Greek regions’’
(Sartzetakis 2003).
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The adoption of the Greek nationalist ideology by the CoG was
a pragmatic decision of the latter. As Makrides put it,
its enforced marginalisation rendered the adoption of a survival policy abso-
lutely necessary. Its worldliness was in fact a defensive mechanism, designed to
prove that despite its status being challenged and its internal deficiencies, it still
had a pivotal and functional social role to perform. . . . In this way, the church
managed to polish its public image and to compensate for its numerous
deficiencies in other domains. (Makrides 1997, pp. 185-190)
From this perspective, the strong link between Orthodoxy and
Greek identity appears to have even been strengthened by the process
of secularisation.
Throughout the history of independent Greece, the CoG strongly
supported Greek nationalism and irredentism. The nationalisation of
Eastern Orthodoxy was not confined only within the borders of the
Greek state, however. The situation was much the same in Bulgaria,
where the nationalised Orthodox Church was involved even in forcible
conversions of Muslims during the Balkan Wars (Velinov 2001,
pp. 87-95; Karagiannis 2005, pp. 79-81). In the early 20th century,
nationalism had penetrated even the Patriarchate of Constantinople
(Kitromilides 1989, pp. 183-184).10 Finally, nationalism managed to
marginalise universalistic versions of Eastern Orthodoxy to a signifi-
cant extent. On occasions, the church’s nationalism in Greece was so
radical and uncompromising that it became a problem for the political
leadership of the country.
During and after the civil war (1946-1949), which left a deep divide
in Greek society, the CoG developed into one of the main carriers of
the second master ideology of the Greek state: anticommunism. The
term ethnikofrosyni (‘‘national-mindedness’’), widely used in post-war
Greece until the mid-1970s, indicates a particular combination of
nationalism and anticommunism (cf. Alivizatos 1983). While clergy-
men who had sympathised or collaborated with the left-controlled
resistance against the German occupation were expelled from the
ranks of the church, those who took up the cause of anticommunism
gained the upper hand. The church’s engagement in anticommunist
nationalism since the Civil War also entailed the cooperation of cler-
gymen with the armed forces. Several powerful clergymen of this
period had ‘‘served’’ in the national army during the civil war, while
others offered their services even in the anticommunist concentration
10 Against the background of their impla-
cable confrontation with the Bulgarian Ex-
archate, bishops of the Greek Patriarchate
increasingly identified with Greek national-
ism, though the Patriarchate had officially
condemned nationalism some decades ago.
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camp of Makronisos, ‘‘making their own contribution to the ‘re-
education of the detainees’’’ (Karagiannis 1997, p. 92). In view of the
prevalence of anticommunism in post-war Greek politics as well as the
increasing political influence of paraecclesiastical organisations cham-
pioning the ideological fusion of nationalism, anticommunism and
Eastern Orthodoxy, the CoG moved more and more toward the
extreme right-wing of the political spectrum. Next to the royal court
and the armed forces, the church constituted a central pillar of the
post-war ‘‘Kingdom of the Right’’ (Svoronos 2007, p. 144), which
violated democratic procedures and fundamental citizen rights under
the pretence of fighting against communist danger. The following
regime of the military junta (1967-1974) enjoyed decisive support
from the CoG. No word of protest was heard from the church when
the civil rights and liberties of Greek citizens were trampled upon:
many were arrested, tortured and deported to concentration camps.
Quite the contrary, many years after the fall of the junta regime,
right-wing populist nationalism survives in the CoG, despite its
remarkably low level of appeal to the Greek population. So, Arch-
bishop Christodoulos did not shy away from praising the patriotism of
putschist officers and other Greek fascists publicly (Lipowatz 1998).
The nationalisation of the church’s ideology is especially visible in
the deep involvement of the CoG in issues of ‘‘national’’ importance. One
recent example is its active role in organising mass demonstrations
against the ‘‘appropriation’’ of the name Macedonia by the newly
independent former Yugoslav republic. The strongest resistance
against a compromise in this extremely embarrassing matter still
comes from the church. Similar radical nationalist reactions come
from the church with regard to the Cyprus issue or Turkey’s inclusion
in the European Union. In fact, the CoG does not interfere in all
political matters; primarily it takes up issues, which are of ‘‘national’’
importance. By equating identity cards with national identity, the
church also managed to transform the entry of religious affiliation in
the Greek identity cards into a national – non-religious – issue.
Nowhere is the primacy of nationalism over religion, however, exem-
plified more clearly than in the CoG’s view concerning the conscientious
objectors who invoke religious grounds. The CoG and, in particular,
Archbishop Christodoulos repeatedly criticised the right of Greek
citizens to conscientious objection for religious reasons pointing out
the harmful consequences of this right for national security. Archbishop
Christodoulos even went as far as suggesting lobotomy as the appro-
priate measure to bring those citizens to reason (Christodoulos 1995).
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The nationalisation of the ideology of the CoG sheds a different
light on its hegemonic position in modern Greece. As an institution
that is primarily concerned with the destiny of the nation and not
a religious community in a strict sense, the church appears as a pre-
dominantly secular institution. Its hegemonic position and the
numerous Orthodox symbols found in everyday life in Greece attest
therefore not so much to the ubiquity of religious but rather
nationalist ideology in the country. This observation points to a small
but significant differentiation concerning the link between nation and
religion in Greece (as well as in most of the Balkan states): it is not the
belief itself but the formal representations of the belief that are pivotal
to the concept of the nation in this part of the world. If nationalism
is considered an integral part of modernity, the link between
religious and national symbolism is to be understood as a particu-
larity of modernity in this part of the world. Moreover, it provides
evidence of Eastern Orthodoxy’s capacity to adapt to a changing world
(Makrides 2005, p. 198). Given that Greek modernists share the view
that the CoG has been secularised through its appropriation of the
national ideology, one wonders why they frame the recent crisis between
state and church as a problem of secularism (Manitakis 2000, p. 17).
Challenges and open future
The pattern of secularism in Greece, reflected on the one hand in
the strong secular control and debilitation of the church as organisa-
tion and in the secularisation of church ideology on the other, can
be termed as ‘‘nationalisation of the church’’ (cf. Stavrakakis 2003,
p. 165). In the last few decades, this historically grown model has
been challenged by two major developments: democratisation of the
country and globalisation – both processes that result in stronger
pluralism of Greek politics and society (Prodromou 2002, 2004). Both
developments bring to the fore significant parallels to as well as
variations from historical developments in Western and Central
Europe. As Casanova noted, in the early phase of modern state
formation the churches became subject to the principle of territorial-
isation, which was at the very core of this new system.
In the early absolutist phase every state and church in Europe tried to reproduce
the model of Christendom according to the principle cuius regio eius religio,
which de facto meant that all the territorial national churches fell under the
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caesaropapist control of the absolutist state. This model of church-state fusion
was already challenged by the liberal-democratic state and is now undermined
further by processes of globalisation. The liberal state challenged the monop-
olistic claims of churches by introducing either principled constitutional
separation and religious freedom or expedient religious toleration. Globalisation
furthers this process by undermining the principle of territoriality at various
levels. (Casanova 2001, p. 424)
Contrary to common perception, even the Catholic Church has
not always been a transnational organisation. It was not until the late
nineteenth century that the Catholic Church was faced with the
opportunity of reclaiming its transnational profile, and started de-
veloping again into a transnational organisation, independent of the
individual nation-states. Greece is different in that processes of
liberalisation and democratisation did not accompany the modernisa-
tion of the country since the early nineteenth century. The long
parliamentary tradition of the Greek nation-state should not gloss
over the fact that until 1974, and with the exception of short periods of
time, Greece was an authoritarian state. The historically contingent
processes of democratisation and liberalisation gained ground much
later in Greece than in Western Europe, only shortly before the latest
wave of globalisation. Accordingly, the configuration sketched above is
to be viewed as that of a modern but authoritarian nation-state. A
further important difference is that the set of possible courses of
action for the CoG to meet the challenges of democratisation and
globalisation varies considerably from the options available to
churches at different times in other parts of Europe. Whether
democratisation and globalisation are seen as opportunities or threats
depends heavily on the contextual factors and the resources available
to churches, as does the decision about the appropriate way to meet
challenges posed by these processes. Therefore, it would be wrong to
expect the CoG to react in the same way, as did the Catholic Church,
once the model of state-church fusion in Greece had been challenged.
The fact, however, that the CoG is exclusively concerned with its
own fate as an organisation and much less with the fate of its believers
(Pollis 1993, p. 353) is not due to an alleged Orthodox theological
concept of the person, but to its weak position vis-a`-vis the state. As
part of the state administration, the church was never in a position to
take a dissident stance. On the contrary, the lower the legitimacy of
political power in Greece, the more important was the legitimising
role of the church, and vice versa. This simple formula illustrates the
enormous potential for conflict once democratisation processes were
under way in the country since 1974.
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Actually, the threat from democratisation (for the CoG) did not
come from the political elites of the country favouring a state-church
separation; it arose more from the fact that the church was losing its
familiar functions in modern Greek society. The democratic govern-
ments of the post-dictatorship era in Greece were no longer reliant on
church support for their legitimacy. Introduction of democracy,
therefore, represents the first major political break in the history of
Greece that was not accompanied by an intervention in church
matters. Contrary to what one may have expected, introduction of
democracy in the year 1974 did not result in the dismissal of the
Archbishop of Athens. After he passed away in 1998, the election of
his successor was the first election of an Archbishop of Athens in
which the state did not interfere at all. Similarly, the church charter of
1977, which grants the CoG a certain degree of internal autonomy, is
owed to democratisation in Greece. Against this background, it is
hardly surprising that the church has turned more against the
government of the country in the post-dictatorship era. For the first
time in its history, the CoG is in a position to articulate political
opposition and it does so. The advocates of the ‘‘European model of
modernity’’ in Greece, who had repeatedly reproached the church for
its subservience to the state in the past, should particularly appreciate
this turn of events. Instead, they call upon the church to continue
doing what it has always been doing: following the politics of, and not
creating problems to, the state. Since the Greek state is increasingly
dissociating itself from exclusive nationalism, the church is expected
to follow and give up its nationalist discourse (Manitakis 2000, p. 92).
It cannot be stressed enough, however, that the speeches of Arch-
bishop Christodoulos, despite their politically reactionary and some-
times obviously anti-Semitic tones, are owed to democracy in Greece.
Although the church is still tightly linked to the state, its growing
readiness to oppose the state illustrates its emancipation (Stavrakakis
2003, p. 167) and, therefore, its preparedness for being transformed
into a civil society actor with its own agenda.
Globalisation, in turn, challenges the pattern of secularism in
Greece in two respects: on the one hand, Greece’s integration into
transnational political and legal structures limits the state’s discre-
tionary authority in a number of issues. Despite their continuing
importance in the global governance, nation-states are no longer
masters in their own house the way they were some decades ago. In
a sense, the European integration process deprives the CoG of the
very foundation of its hegemonic position: discretionary power of its
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protector, the state. New actors like the EU administration or the
European Court of Human Rights increasingly penetrate and shape
Greek public life. If fundamental principles of European political
ideology, such as human rights and liberalism, are to be implemented,
some liberalisation of the Greek religious market is inevitable. Under
these circumstances, violations of human rights to protect the
hegemonic position of the CoG are hardly tenable. On the other
hand, the Greek population is becoming increasingly transnational. In
the 1990s, Greece turned from a traditional emigration country into
an immigration country. The consequent pluralisation of Greek
society makes the historically grown pattern of secularism look
increasingly inappropriate.
The present crisis in state-church relations in Greece has been
caused by their open future, as nothing is self-evident the way it was
forty years ago. This generates uncertainty within the CoG, which like
most churches in Eastern Europe, is not endowed with the necessary
resources to face the new challenges (cf. Davie 2001, p. 458). Still, this
does not mean that the CoG refuses to face up to reality. Despite
distinctively anti-European tones in the statements of the clergy, the
attitude of the CoG towards the European Union cannot be described
as that of enmity or confrontation. As already mentioned above, the
concentration on the populist and nationalist language of the CoG has
caused misunderstandings on many occasions. For several reasons,
among which the strong pro-European attitude of the Greek pop-
ulation, the CoG cannot afford to head for a confrontation with the
European Union. In fact, a number of indications reveal that the CoG
acknowledges the new political transnational reality. For instance, by
opening an office in Brussels, the CoG has recognised the significance
of acting as an independent actor in the transnational European arena as
well as the possibility of making a contribution to the European
integration project. One of the primary objectives of the CoG is to
campaign for a Europe that remains conscious of its Christian roots.
Meanwhile, the CoG can expect more support for this project from an
old arch-enemy, the Pope, than from an old ally, the Greek state. In
their joint declaration on an historical site in Athens, Pope John-Paul II
and Archbishop Christodoulos confirmed the following:
We rejoice at the success and progress of the European Union. The union of the
European world in one civil entity, without her people losing their national self-
awareness, traditions and identity, has been the vision of its pioneers. However,
the emerging tendency to transform certain European countries into secular
states without any reference to religion constitutes a retraction and a denial of
159
the greek state and the orthodox church
use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003975609000447
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 10 Jul 2017 at 15:09:37, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of
their spiritual legacy. We are called to intensify our efforts so that the unification
of Europe may be accomplished. We shall do everything in our power, so that
the Christian roots of Europe and its Christian soul may be preserved inviolate.
(Common Declaration 2001)
The deeply hegemonic language of the CoG is translated into
a language of multiculturalism in public texts with reference to
European integration. According to the CoG, the European integra-
tion process should not boil down to cultural homogenisation, and the
European Union, in designing its policies, should seriously consider
distinctive characteristics of the people, their history, culture and
familiar way of life.11 This clearly shows that the CoG is fully aware of
the tension between human rights liberalism and multiculturalism
within European Union, a tension, which has caused serious contra-
dictions in the European governance of religious diversity. Despite the
fact that private freedom of religion is considered to be an absolute
right, there is a tendency to interpret state-church relations as symbols
of national identity in the European legal order (Koenig 2007).12 This
may not imply that state-church relations can be designed in a way
that violates fundamental rights of religious freedom; it, nevertheless,
allows regulations that go far beyond the principles of state-church
separation or state neutrality towards all religious communities. Against
this background, the demanding attitude of the CoG vis-a`-vis the state
seems to be founded not on a miscalculation of power relations within
Europe, but on a very accurate calculation of these relations. The
church expects to exploit fully in its favour the leeway found in the
contradictions in European religious governance. The popular
‘‘translation’’ of legal reforms in religious matters in Greece as
European ‘‘requirements’’ (and subsequently ‘‘unavoidable’’) is, in
the eyes of the church, not credible at all. Indeed, even if occasionally
correct, such ‘‘translations’’ are rather reminiscent of the selective
11 On the subject, see also the speeches of
Archbishop Christodoulos published on the
homepage of the Church of Greece, under
the header ‘‘Europe’’ (http://www.ecclesia.gr/
greek/archbishop/europe.htm).
12 Koenig remarks that ‘‘[u]nder Article 9
of the European Convention on Human
Rights, private freedom of thought, con-
science and religion is considered to be an
absolute right, whereas the freedom to pub-
licly manifest one’s religion may be restricted
by law. In its jurisprudence on Article 9
ECHR . . . the European Court of Human
Rights has granted states considerable mar-
gins of appreciation in interfering in the
freedom to manifest one’s belief, on the
condition that such interference be pre-
scribed by law, have a legitimate aim and be
necessary in a ‘democratic society.’ . . . A
Declaration, adopted along with the Treaty
of Amsterdam (1997) after strong lobbying of
the German churches, . . . clearly articulates
the nation-states’ sovereignty in Church-
State relations’’ (Koenig 2007, pp. 917-922).
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politics of ‘‘cunning states,’’ i.e. states that ‘‘deny power only to
deploy it in order to evade responsibility’’ (Randeria 2007, p. 6).
Moreover, the CoG recognises not only the dangers but also the
opportunities arising from the integration of the country into the
European Union and other transnational structures. Whereas for a long
time the Greek state has guaranteed – and continues to guarantee – its
dominant position in the symbolic realm, the European Human
Rights Convention has proved to be an important protection for its
material resources. Significantly, after Greece recognized the individ-
ual right to file a complaint at the European Commission of Human
Rights in 1986, the first suit against the Greek state was filed by
eight Greek convents. The background of the complaint was a law
issued by the socialist government Papandreou that provided for the
expropriation of the land of the CoG. Interestingly, the eight convents
founded their complaint on the violation of property rights and
freedom of religion, while the Greek state pointed to the status of
the convents as public entities in order to deny them the right to file
a claim to the European Human Rights Court (Venizelos 2000, p. 95).
The Court ruled in favour of the complainants and the Greek state
was asked to pay significant compensation. Furthermore, the
European Funds represent an important source of finance for
numerous church projects. While a few years ago most churches
and convents were in a precarious condition, the majority has
now been repaired and restored. Finally, it is important to mention
the reform agenda of the CoG, aiming primarily at raising the
educational level of the clergy, extending its social welfare network
(Anastassiadis 2004, pp. 25-30) but also achieving greater economic
independence. In a long but not much noticed text presented by
Archbishop Christodoulos to the Holy Synod on October 11, 2000, he
stated the following:
Our essential goal must be bringing order into our sector. The events push us in
that direction and oblige us to find solutions before it is too late. The situation of
the church today calls for surgical cuts and not for tranquilizers.
The text concludes with a number of spiritual and practical
recommendations. It appeals for self-criticism by the bishops, quick
and comprehensive redesigning of pastoral work to meet the present
challenges, utilisation of all existing spiritual powers, better use of
laymen, education and continuous training of the clergy and church
staff, reorganisation of the youth work within the church, innovations
in the services, preparation for a separation of state and church no
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matter who demands it – the state or the church –, a scientific study of
the potential of economic independence of the church, communi-
cative efforts to promote the position of the church in public life,
improvement of the church law, reform of the church administra-
tion, determination of the church’s position on church property,
extension of the church’s activities in the social field (e.g. foundation
of schools at all levels, professional schools, universities with post-
graduate programmes, and hospitals, and active involvement in the
fight against drugs) (Christodoulos 2000). Focussing on spectacular
conflicts between church and state in Greece hinders one from
considering the agenda for reform, an agenda, which makes it
evident that the CoG is reflecting on its position in a changing
world.
Concluding remarks
Orthodoxy has never been a private matter in Greece. Due to its
politicisation and nationalisation, it has been part and parcel of Greek
public life both before and after the introduction of democracy.
Therefore, I do not consider the framework of deprivatisation of
religion to be particularly fruitful in understanding the public perfor-
mance of the CoG over the last years (Roudometof 2005, p. 100; cf.
Casanova 1994). What we are witnessing in Greece today is the effort
of the CoG not to (re-)enter but to remain a relevant actor in the
public arena. A more context-sensitive approach would identify signs
of the privatisation of the church in the sense of its gradual disentan-
glement and emancipation from the state. The slow process of church
privatisation in Greece is not being accompanied by de-secularisation,
in terms of de-nationalisation, of the church’s ideology. It is not
expected to happen in the future either, since the strong nationalist
ideology of the CoG in the era of globalisation does not represent
a weakness as is sometimes suggested (Sotirelis 1999, pp. 78-79;
Manitakis 2000, p. 130; cf. Roudometof 2005, p. 101). Two interre-
lated points need to be made here. First, nationalism is not swept away
but merely reconfigured by globalisation processes. Second, ‘‘the
liberation of the churches from the straight-jacket of the nation-state’’
against the background of globalisation processes (Casanova 2001,
p. 433) does not make transnationalisation the sole adequate future
scenario for the affected churches. The Catholic Church has probably
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benefited significantly from its continuous transnationalisation begin-
ning with the last decades of the nineteenth century, and the
Pentecostal-Charismatic movement has perhaps gained considerable
ground due to its global claim and transnational network structures
(Martin 2002; Corten and Marshall-Fratani 2001), but other
churches in different contexts, with different resources and different
histories may consider other pathways more suitable and advanta-
geous for them. Privatisation does not make necessary an ideological
shift in the CoG. On the contrary: while it becomes more and more
difficult for a state embedded in transnational structures and
confronted with an increasingly culturally heterogeneous population
to create national identity, the CoG could maintain and further
benefit from its function as a carrier of national identity. Taking into
account that, in the post-modern era of globalisation, identity issues
have become issues of pivotal importance, the CoG can use its
secular ideology as one of its key resources to survive in a globalised
world (cf. Voye 1999). From this perspective, the salient nationalism
of the CoG does not indicate that it is behind time but rather that it
keeps up with the time.
It is difficult to predict today the dimension that the privatisa-
tion of the CoG will finally take, and to what extent this process will
correlate with the privatisation of social welfare against the back-
ground of neo-liberal globalisation (Davie 2001; Anastassiadis 2004,
p. 25). Anticipating the strong reaction of the church, the democratic
governments of the country repeatedly avoided setting a general plan
for the church’s privatisation on their agenda. Instead, they prefer to
implement a politics of slow and unspectacular disentanglement. The
church’s fierce stance on the identity cards issue should be viewed as
an effort to gain time as well as control over this tacit regulation of
church-state relations (cf. Anastassiadis 2004, p. 31). Although there is
no doubt that the CoG does not belong to the advocates of state-
church separation in Greece, I think that the essential concern of the
CoG is not to hinder its privatisation. Its efforts towards modernisa-
tion and an increasingly independent political position stand as proof
that it is preparing for it. One would be grossly underestimating the
church if one thought that it needed to be convinced of the advantages
of privatisation; it is already aware of them. In contrast to many of its
critics, however, the CoG always thinks in context. It may not be
sceptical about privatisation as such, but it would have reservations
about the terms under which privatisation would take place. Just as
ailing state enterprises need to be prepared for the market initially with
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government support before they are left to their own devices, the CoG
expects, above all, government support if it were to face the challenges
of privatisation successfully. In turn, this expectation is based on the
conviction that the state has the primary responsibility for the present
situation and limited capabilities of the church. As long as the political
actors refuse to take note of this expectation – and the advocates of
state-church separation are deafeningly silent on this issue – the
church will bring the totality of its nationalist expertise into play in
order to make it clear to the state that a unilateral termination of the
long-standing relationship between state and church will be painful
not only for the church but also for the state. The ‘‘change of course’’
of the CoG announced after the death of Archbishop Christodoulos
will not alter this fundamental expectation; what may alter is the way
in which the CoG will try to draw the state’s attention to its
responsibilities.
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Resume
Il s’agit de la secularisation en Gre`ce. L’ar-
ticle s’ecarte des interpretations modernistes
et civilisationnistes prevalentes de la crise des
relations entre l’E´glise et l’E´tat. Tenant pour
acquis qu’il ne saurait y avoir un mode`le
unique de modernite et de secularisme, l’ar-
ticle entend montrer que l’imbrication E´tat/
E´glise dans la Gre`ce moderne ne signifie ni
modernite incomple`te, ni secularisation in-
comple`te. La faiblesse structurelle de l’E´glise
orthodoxe est au cœur du mode`le tre`s particulier
de secularisation. La crise resulte du heurt avec
democratisation et globalisation. Le nationa-
lisme de l’E´glise ne doit pas eˆtre vu comme
traditionalisme aveugle ou antimodernisme.
Mots cles : Securalisme ; Relation E´tat/E´gli-
se ; Modernite ; Nationalisme ; Orthodoxie
orientale ; Gre`ce.
Zusammenfassung
Die S€akularisation Griechenlands steht im
Mittelpunkt der Betrachtung. Moderne und
zivilisatorische Aspekte der k€urzlichen Krise
der Staat-Kirche-Beziehung werden disku-
tiert, wobei es kein Einheitsmodell gibt, das
zu Modernit€at und S€akularisation f€uhrt. Die
griechische Staat-Kirche-Beziehung kann
deshalb weder als unvollst€andige Modernit€at
noch als unvollst€andige S€akularisation be-
trachtet werden. Dieser Beitrag untersucht
sowohl die strukturelle Schw€ache der ortho-
doxen Kirche des modernen Griechenland
als auch die griechische S€akularisation der
Kirchenideologie. Die k€urzliche Krise ist ein
Ergebnis der doppelten Herausforderung
von Demokratisierung und Globalisierung.
Desweiteren kann der Nationalismus der
Kirche weder als blind noch als antimodern
betrachtet werden kann.
Schlagw€orter: S€akularisation; Staat-Kirche-
Beziehung; Modernit€at; Nationalismus;
O¨stliche Orthodoxie; Griechenland.
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